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It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental Policy Implications
for Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty
By Terry L. Anderson andJ. Bishop Grewell*
The world is shrinking. Increased interactions between nations, especially in the
areas of trade and commerce, have led to an interwoven global community. At the
same time, some actors on the world stage have confused this increased globalization
as necessitating increased international government action. This is prevalent in
environmental policy. Before 1970, only thirty-seven environmental treaties were in
force. After 1970, an additional 104 were created.1
Environmental concerns have not only moved onto the radar screen in the
international policy sphere, they have become a dominant force. This became evident
in 1999 when a group of environmental protestors joined with union activists and self-
proclaimed anarchists to disrupt the Seattle meeting of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), an international body that promotes free trade by settling
trade disputes between countries.
The protestors objected to decisions by the WTO and its predecessor, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), that treated environmental
regulations as trade barriers. Under GATT and the WTO, governments are not
allowed to ban imports based on their means of production and processing. So, for
example, GATT panels ruled that US regulations barring imports of tuna not caught
in a dolphin-safe manner were protectionist. After the initial ruling in 1991,
environmentalists circulated posters in Paris, Tokyo, and Washington showing the
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monster "Gattzilla" smashing the US capitol, spilling DDT from one hand, and
squeezing a dolphin to death with the other
The rioting in Seattle and the 2001 protests in Quebec City by members of the
environmental community were attempts to shape international debate and to bend
the rules of international law to their liking. The changes they have brought about-
and continue to promote-are the subject of this paper.
These efforts have serious impacts. First, there is less trade, which raises
international tension. Second, economic growth suffers as a result and, in turn,
weakens the ability to protect and restore long-term environmental health. Third,
nations' sovereignty and the accountability it provides are compromised. Finally,
regulations become more centralized, creating a nightmare of monitoring and
enforcement problems when applied to diverse regions and peoples.
Fortunately, there is an option to this "greening" of foreign policy, an option
called free market environmentalism Those adopting this approach to environmental
issues recognize that the best way to improve the international environment is to act
out the adage, "think globally, act locally." Because different parts of the world require
different solutions to environmental problems, decentralized policies that
acknowledge national sovereignty are preferable to multinational "one size doesn't fit
anyone" solutions. Under free market environmentalism, only problems that cross the
borders of countries become international issues.
This paper examines how foreign policy involving trade, defense, diplomacy, and
international law is being "greened" at home and abroad as environmental groups
pressure government agencies to give environmental concerns greater weight. It argues
that these changes represent a fundamental shift in US foreign policy and
international relations. It identifies problems that arise from these revisions and
explains how free market environmentalism offers a sound alternative that will lead to
better environmental protection through freer trade, increased wealth, and
decentralization.
I. GREENER POLICIES AT DEFENSE AND STATE4
Between 1984 and 1994, Department of Defense ("DOD") spending on
environmental programs such as the conservation of resources on military bases and
2. Nancy Dunne, Fears Over 'Gattzilla the Trade Monster', Fin Times 13 (Jan 30, 1992).
3. Economists increasingly accept the benefits of markets in protecting the environment. In academic
circles, this framework for understanding environmental problems is sometimes known as the New
Resource Economics. For a general discussion, see Terry L. Anderson, The New Resource Economnics:
Old Ideas and New Applications, 64 AmJ Agr Econ 928 (1982).
4. For a general discussion on the greening of international bodies including the United Nations,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and International Criminal Court, see
Schaefer, Green Creep at 41 (cited in note 1).
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environmental research jumped from $250 million to $5 billion. That twenty-fold
increase accounted for nearly two percent of the department's annual budget." While
the DOD should pay for environmental harm that it causes, that is not the primary
place it is spending these fimds. In 1999, the military devoted only $51 million of the
Pentagon's several billion dollar environmental budget to cleaning up training ranges
while the Defense Science Board, a Pentagon advisory group, estimated that it would
cost $15 billion to decontaminate just five percent of the millions of US acres that
have been employed as bombing and target ranges Instead of environmental cleanup,
the DOD has been required to spend funds on items such as changing military
operations and procedures on the twenty-five million acres under its control in order
to protect endangered species.'
As the idea of a "greener" DOD began to germinate in the early 1990s, the
Department created a new position, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, to
deal solely with environmental issues. At President Clinton's order in 1993, the
position was elevated to the status of a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. Clinton
further modified the department's mission when his preface to the 1997 National
Security Strategy listed countering environmental damage among the "core national
security objectives."' Much of the DOD's budgetary shift away from defense and
toward environmental protection can be attributed to the relaxed atmosphere at the
end of the Cold War Though it makes sense to decrease expenditures on defense in
light of a reduced threat, it does not follow that more should be spent on
environmental protection or that the DOD should be doing it.
In fact, Congress tried to temper the shift in DOD objectives. In a roll call vote
in the House on May 20, 1998, the House passed by 420-1 an amendment to the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 stating that "no provision of the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
or any regulation issued pursuant to such protocol, shall restrict the procurement,
training, or operation and maintenance of the United States Armed Forces"t Short
of a serious new security threat, however, it seems unlikely that environmentalists will
lose their foothold at the DOD.
The State Department is also focusing more on environmental issues at the
expense of traditional diplomatic functions. On Earth Day 1997, the State
Department released its initial report on the environment and foreign policy called
5. Id at 61.
6. David Armstrong, Environmental Injustirc/Goemniinent as Polluter More Costly Ctanup on &: Horntn,
Boston Globe A23 (Nov 14,1999).
7. Schaefer, Green Creep at 61 (cited in note 1).
8. Id at 62.
9. Id at 61-62.
10. Amendment to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, 105th Cong, 2d Ses
(May 20,1998), in 144 Cong Rec H 3574, H 3582 (May 20,1998).
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Environmental Diplomacy: The Environment and U.S. Foreign Policy, Challenges for the
Planet.11 This report provides the strategy for advancing global environmental
protection through diplomatic efforts, international organizations, and multilateral
treaties.
Numerous official State Department pronouncements have featured
environmental goals. In a State Department document entitled the United States
Strategic Plan for International Affairs, "global issues" are listed alongside national security
as primary goals. Two of President Clinton's three global issues are a sustainable
environment and a stabilized world population.
John Cohrssen lists environmental diplomacy changes proposed by then-
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. These include "appointment of an Under
Secretary for Global Affairs; requests to embassies and bureaus to develop regional
environmental activities; 'new' regional environmental hubs at five embassies, making
environmental cooperation with other countries important; the pursuit of
environmental priorities for climate change, toxic chemicals, species extinction,
deforestation, and marine degradation; and advances in several treaty areas.""3 Schaefer
concludes that the State Department "has morphed from a representative of US
foreign policy priorities in international treaty negotiations to an advocate of
international environmental treaties."4 To the extent that environmental issues
threaten national security, this new emphasis may be justified, but to the extent that it
puts pressure on other countries to comply with US environmental goals, it is a
questionable use of State Department authority.
The state and defense departments are not the only government bodies shifting
their emphasis toward the environment. The United States Agency for International
Development ("USAID") was founded to help developing countries grow
economically and to prevent the expansion of communism. Its goals, however, have
become increasingly environmental. According to Cohrssen, USAID projects have
been rhetorically repackaged with sustainable development terminology. 5 USAID
now works to eliminate "environmentally unsound" energy production and use. It has
plans to lobby foreign governments to embrace environmental regulation as well as
international efforts to combat global warming and protect biological diversity. 6 To
the detriment of the third-world countries it once purported to help, USAID
11. Schaefer, Green Creep at 47-48 (cited in note 1).
12. Id at 47.
13. John J. Cohrssen, US International Interests, Sustainable Development, and the Precautionary Principle, in
Terry L. Anderson and Henry I. Miller, eds, The Greening of US Foreign Policy 115, 119 (Hoover
2000).
14. Schaefer, Green Creep at 79 (cited in note 1).
15. See Cohrssen, US International Interests at 120 (cited in note 13).
16. Schaefer, Green Creep at 49 (cited in note 1).
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discourages the use of DDT to combat malaria because of concerns about the
chemical's environmental impact.'7
The Clinton administration's emphasis on environmental issues caused a
confrontation with Congress over his fast-track authority on trade issues. The
purpose of fast-track is to streamline the progress of free trade agreements through
Congress once they have been reached between countries. With fast-track in place,
Congress must vote on trade legislation submitted by the president without adding
any amendments, and it must do so within sixty days. Congressional members cannot
tinker with the agreements to favor special interests, and the partner countries learn
quickly whether the agreement has final approval. Congress had granted fast-track
authority to every president since 1974.
Since 1994, however, Congress has refused to grant fast-rack authority. One of
the reasons was President Clintons insistence on including supposed protections for
environment and labor in the authority. The stalemate brought US trade negotiations
to a virtual standstill in the latter half of the 1990s.
Over the long run, delays in trade liberalization hurt environmental quality. As
mounting evidence cited below indicates, economic growth leads to environmental
protection after a certain level of income is reached. Hence, slowing trade causes
economic stagnation in the Third World, keeping the standard of living low and
retarding environmental improvement.
II. TRADE GoEs "GREEN"
Environmental issues are shaping international trade agreements. GATT, which
was signed in 1948, did not mention the environment, but the WTO, which was
created out of the 1994 Uruguay GATT meetings, includes references to both
sustainable development and the need to protect and preserve the environment.' Yet
for those who proclaim dedication to the environment, the WTO does not go far
enough. They want it disbanded or changed so that environmental regulations are
• 19
never treated as trade barriers.
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") is another trade
agreement that incorporates environmentally popular causes. Initially aimed at
reducing protectionist trade policies between the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
NAFTA incorporated such provisions as requiring the signatory countries to meet
17. Richard Tren and Roger Bate, When Politics Kills: Malaria and te DDT Story (Compenive Enterprise
Institute 2000).
18. Schaefer, Green Creep at 56 (cited in note 1).
19. It should be noted that in both of the controversial environmental decisions by the \\rTO the final
rulings did not prevent the country where the regulation originated from imposing the restniions
on its own citizens and businesses. Rather, it simply held chat imposition of the regulation on the
denizens of another country was a protectionist measure.
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certain automobile emissions standards. These provisions exported US environmental
standards to Mexico.
In addition, under Article 104 of NAFTA, multilateral environmental
agreements signed by both parties supersede any conflicts those agreements might
have with NAFTA.2 Assume, for example, that the United States and Mexico sign
an environmental agreement that makes economic sanctions a penalty for failing to cut
back on carbon dioxide emissions. Such an agreement would take precedence over
tariff elimination under NAFTA.
The "greening" of NAFTA and the WTO was just the beginning. In November
1999, President Clinton's Executive Order 13141 directed the government to come up
with guidelines that would subject future trade agreements to much stricter
environmental reviews. The guidelines were published in the Federal Register for public
21
comment.
In October of 2000, just before leaving office, President Clinton signed a trade
agreement with the nation ofJordan that included environmental and labor standards.
In order to bypass criticism for exporting US environmental and labor standards to a
country that could not afford them, the Jordan agreement only requires each country
to enforce its own laws. Still, it leaves either country free to use obscure violations of
law as an excuse for restricting trade. Clinton initiated similar trade deals with
Singapore and Chile in the closing days of his administration.
In effect, Jordan could navigate the US laws to find technical violations and
employ those violations as an excuse for sanctions. Finding violations will not be a
problem given that a 1993 survey by the National Law Journal found that only thirty
percent of corporate counsels believe that complete compliance with US
environmental laws is even possible.'
III. CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is also changing along environmental lines. Traditionally,
international law dealt with interactions between the governments of nation-states.
But with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international law began
to address individual rights and obligations, areas previously left to the nation-state
itself. As a result, the role of national governments is being eroded as the
representation of individuals moves to the international sphere. Environmental groups
have been working to take advantage of these changes.
20. Schaefer, Green Creep at 54 (cited in note 1).
21. Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, Executive Order 13141, 64 Fed Reg 63196 (Nov 18,
1999).
22. Marianne Lavelle, Environment Vise: Law, Compliance Companies Staff Up and Struggle to Stay Ahead of the
Green Machine, Nat LJ S1 (Aug 30, 1993).
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International law generally forms via one of two routes, either treaties or custom.
Treaties are formal agreements by the governments of nations. Today, customary
international law ("CI") is established when international courts decide that certain
rules or norms are shared widely enough that they reflect "custom."" In the strictest
sense, traditional customary law can be seen as similar to the common law and, in fact,
is often the basis for the common law. CIL arose in a way similar to common law,
reflecting what was assumed to be the customary laws of private society. Hence, CIL
evolved from a bottom-up, grassroots sense of custom.
A new interpretation of CIL has started to arise, though. Several law theorists
have concluded that the unanimous or near-unanimous passage of resolutions and
declarations by an international organization such as the UN General Assembly
constitutes a basis for CIL. Patrick Kelly notes that in the case of Nicaragua v United
States,24 the International Court of Justice used the countries' consent to nonbinding
UN resolutions as the basis for part of its decision and termed the decision in
accordance with CIL. This is a top-down approach, unlike the traditional evolution of
customary law.
Indeed, Fernand Keuleneer states that international courts base many of their
decisions on the conclusions of UN agencies." These decisions or resolutions are not
international law per se, but they are used as evidence of emerging custom. Thus, CIL
can be indirectly created by agencies that have no legislative power and, while
ostensibly answering to the national powers that appoint them, are unchecked by any
particular body of citizens. Kelly writes, "This 'new CIL' approach is the preferred
methodology of human rights activists and environmental advocates.'
Under customary law, human rights have obtained the status of an international
legal norm, largely based on those parts of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights that the US has decided to accept. International law could wield a hefty sword
because it enables domestic courts to invoke a fundamental international right
without any laws being passed by the nation's representatives. Kelly finds that "new
CI' theorists are attempting to create a new process of lawmaking rather than
utilizing the methodology of customary law."'
In the case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala, for example, the Second Circuit of the US
Court of Appeals held that CIL or the law of nations has always been part of US
federal common law and thus has recognized human rights as part of that body of
23. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twiligbt of Customary International Latv, 40 Va J Ind L 449, 468 (2000)
(arguing that this has largely reflected Western views of custom).
24. Id at 476 n 115; Nicaragua v United States, 1986 ICJ 14 (1986).
25. Fernand Keuleneer, Environmentalism, tbe Tratufornation of International Law,. an{ de Pursuit OfPcItral
Objectives, in Terry L Anderson and Henry I. Miller, eds, T: Greening of US Forergn Poliq 31, 33-34
(Hoover 2000).
26. Kelly, 40 VaJ Ind L at 485 (cited in note 23).
27. Id at 492.
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law.2 Thus, Kelly notes that the US Senate has made sure to include numerous
reservations, declarations, and understandings in human rights treaties to ensure that
the treaties do not become a self-executing part of US law.'
Environmental groups are lobbying to get certain environmental considerations
treated as human rights and ultimately as part of CIL. In 1994, a formal campaign to
create a document known as the Earth Charter was begun by Maurice F. Strong,
Chairman of the Earth Council, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Green Cross International.
The campaign received support from the government of the Netherlands. The Earth
Charter's website clarifies the goal of the project: "The Earth Charter will be designed
as a soft law document. It is, however, important to remember that some documents
like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are initially accepted as soft law
instruments but over the years acquire increasing binding force among those who have
endorsed them."'
The environmental rights that are included in the Earth Charter seem purposely
vague: "All human beings, including future generations, have a right to an
environment adequate for their health, well-being, and dignity, and the responsibility
to protect the environment."" Deciding on the standards adequate to maintain one's
environmental dignity and the responsibilities to protect the environment would likely
be left up to international bureaucrats and the nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") advising them.
These suggested additions to the definition of human rights could give
unprecedented power to environmental interests, especially since, under the evolving
system of international law, NGOs find themselves on the same ground as states and
governments. As Keuleneer puts it, environmentalism is "a powerful tool" for
achieving a shift in global power. 2 He observes that "law is increasingly replaced by
rights, States by networks, and elected officials by judges and appointed NGO-
experts, often operating in a system of auto-reference.
In the introduction to his book Global Greens, James Sheehan also noted the shift
to increasing NGO power, writing, "A new and unprecedented force has been created
in world politics-the nongovernmental organization. NGOs have joined nation-
states, central banks and international agencies as institutions authorized to define the
world's problems and propose policy fixes.""' The rise of NGOs represents a
28. Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 886 (2d Cir 1980).
29. Kelly, 40 Va J Intl L at 466 n 77 (cited in note 23).
30. Keuleneer, Environmentalism at 36 (cited in note 25).
31. Id at 37.
32. Id at 32.
33. Id.
34. James Sheehan, Global Greens: Inside the International Environmental Establishment (Capital Research
Center 1998).
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fundamental shift in power because the groups are accountable to no one but their
own members.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH "GREENING"
In carrying out foreign policy, officials are learning what Kermit the Frog has
known all along- "It isn't easy being green.' Numerous problems are emerging as this
new agenda takes center stage. Increased environmental regulation on an international
level changes many of the rules of the game. As discussed below, it threatens
sovereignty, reduces the accountability that comes from a country's internal system of
checks and balances, and increases international tension. By reducing international
trade, it hurts long-run environmental health, creates more opportunities for
unintended consequences from regulation, and leads to monitoring and enforcement
problems. Finally, it suffers from a lack of the information and accountability that are
available with devolution and decentralization.
A. GREATER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION WEAKENS
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Under traditional international law, disputes settled outside of war-including
environmental ones-were dealt with under a system of national sovereignty.
Disagreeing countries handled matters through bilateral contractual agreements or
arbitration. The new regime evolving under international environmental regulation
seeks international cooperation, which means trying to secure nearly universal
participation. No longer are only a few countries involved in a dispute; rather, the
dispute becomes global. As Jeremy Rabkin writes, "the homeowner who pushes up his
thermostat in Minneapolis has now become the concern of people in Belgium and in
Australia.''
35
International agencies act as ongoing authorities for implementing and directing
the details of a global plan, whether it be the Kyoto Protocol, the Montreal Protocol,
or the Convention on Biological Diversity. The power of sovereign governments is
forfeited to these organizations, as a one-world banner challenges the traditional view
of the sovereign state embodied in international law. Accountability is weakened as
the unelected end up in charge.
While some claim that the WTO curbs sovereignty, this is an exaggeration
because each national government can ultimately decide whether to abide by a ruling
or not. If one country refuses to accept it, the petitioning country may impose
sanctions, something that could be done with or without the WTO. Furthermore,
the rulings apply to just one area-international trade-and in that area only to
35. Jeremy Rabkin, The Value of Sovereignty and de Costs of Glotbal Enzronumntalism, in Terry L Andersfon
and Henry I. Miller, eds, The Greening of US Foreign Policy 1. 8 (Hoover 2000).
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regulations that restrict trade. Thus, it is somewhat like the US Constitution's
Commerce Clause, which spurred free trade among individual states. The WTO
enables national governments to give up regulations that favor special interests.
Furthermore, even if the WTO does curb sovereignty, such a curb may be beneficial
since it reduces barriers rather than builds them. If the WTO erected barriers by
legitimizing trade-restricting environmental or labor standards, then the possible loss
of sovereignty would become more threatening.
In contrast, several international agreements represent genuine threats to
sovereignty. For example, there is talk of an international regulatory agency for the
1997 Kyoto Protocol, an agreement to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. One option is
to trade permits for emitting carbon dioxide. Discussing these permits, John Prescott,
Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, said that he wanted to see "the
equivalent of Interpol to allow police, customs and enforcement agencies to combat...
global illegal trade."6
Similarly, the US State Department's environmental initiative promotes the
United Nations as a police force for the world that will patrol regulations affecting the
emerging science of biotechnology. The UN Industrial Development Organization
proposes that the UN and its agencies advise nations as they create authorities in each
country to monitor genetically modified organisms and their development. 7
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, a product of the UN's Conference
on Environment and Development held in Rio, also has the potential to create
sovereignty problems. It is unclear whether the treaty's signatories will be forced to
adopt a biosafety protocol, that is, regulations on biotechnology to carry out the goals
of the treaty. As Schaefer writes, "The treaty also establishes an international
regulatory framework to examine, regulate, and, in some cases, prevent development
of biotechnology."' If nations adopt such a protocol, who will ensure that proper
regulations have been implemented? The answer is likely to be international agencies.
The real importance of sovereignty is the accountability it levies upon those
making the rules to those who must live by the rules. International agencies have
almost no accountability compared to US domestic agencies, where top officials at
least must be confirmed by the Senate or where funding must be approved by the
House.
In fact, international regulation inherently changes the US Constitution by
weakening the accountability provided by its checks and balances. Agreements such as
the Biodiversity Convention no longer deal solely with conflicts between nations (true
36. Henry I. Miller, Biotechnology Regulation and Foreign Policy: Eccentric Environmentalism Instead of Sound
Science, in Terry L. Anderson and Henry I. Miller, eds, The Greening of US Foreign Policy 221, 230
(Hoover 2000).
37. Id at 229-32.
38. Schaefer, Green Creep at 71 (cited in note 1).
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international issues), but now also deal with problems within specific countries
(intranational issues). For instance, encouraging a country to set aside reserve areas to
keep species from becoming extinct is clearly entering into matters of internal
domestic policy.
This has additional ramifications, one of which is to discourage federalism. If the
US or any other nation is to comply with directives from outside its borders, the
national government will have to crack down on various competing state policies, so
the one-size-fits-all international policy can be implemented. This increased federal
power will trump the current federalist revival that has reinforced the system of
balance between state and federal government.
Another impact of limiting sovereignty is on the checks and balances between the
executive and legislative branches. Changes in the Organization for Economic
Development and Cooperation ("OECD") illustrate how this can occur. The OECD
was created by a 1961 treaty and ratified by the US Senate to help achieve economic
growth in developing countries. In April 1998, a ministerial meeting reinterpreted the
treaty, adding social and environmental considerations to the economic ones. The
executive branch agreed to the changes, but the Senate had no opportunity to debate
this treaty, even though it was changed significantly from the 1961 treaty. In short, the
executive branch negotiated a new deal without Senate approval."
B. GREATER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION CAN INCREASE
INTERNATIONAL TENSION
Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms
trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus
on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues.
Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus
on international threats of violence, such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border
conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues arising
in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with
traditional international issues. As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic currency is
finite... it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on
issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have
been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies,
securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies.
There may indeed be environmental problems that threaten national security,
but the issues currently being given parity with threats of violence, such as sustainable
development and population control, are not among them. It is questionable whether
39. Cohrssen, US International Interests at 127-29 (cited in note 13).
40. Schaefer, Green Creep at 46 (cited in note 1).
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population growth and sustainable development should be a consideration for
international policy at all, since they are not really a transboundary problem, but
rather can be handled within a nation.
Environmental regulation at the international level is divisive. Countries that are
expected to make a greater sacrifice can resent countries they perceive as free riders.
For instance, the United States has expressed concern that India and China are not
joining the Kyoto agreement and thus not contributing to the reduction in output of
greenhouse gases. The US Senate even passed a resolution making approval of the
Kyoto treaty contingent upon full participation by the developing world."' In
response, China and India point out that they are now entering their industrial
revolutions and should be allowed to enjoy the same prosperity that countries such as
the United States already enjoy.
Finally, expanding the foreign policy agenda weakens the enforcement of
violations of international agreements. If we punish India for not complying with the
Kyoto Protocol, what punishment is left if India threatens Pakistan or tests nuclear
weapons on the high seas?
C. GREATER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION CAN REDUCE
FREE TRADE
The unintended consequences of punishment for violating environmental
agreements with trade restrictions should be considered. Trade offers the most likely
route for acceptable punishments. Yet invoking sanctions, tariffs, and other economic
penalties to ensure compliance with international environmental agreements could
rebuild the wall against free trade that the United States and other countries are
working so hard to tear down. And once the wall is up, the wealth and prosperity that
accrue under free trade will be staunched, as will the potential for environmental
progress.
In addition, the effort to subject future trade agreements to more stringent
environmental review risks slowing and even halting future trade agreements
altogether, with enormous impacts on trade and world prosperity. The long-term
effects of stifling wealth creation will harm environmental quality, as developing
countries and former Communist countries take longer to grow wealthy enough to
afford improving environmental quality. Subjecting free trade to subjective
environmental review is shortsighted and misses the bigger picture of long-run
environmental consequences.
41. Jeffrey Salmon, The War Against Warming: Climate Change, Kyoto, and American National Security, in
Terry L. Anderson and Henry I. Miller, eds, The Greening of US Foreign Policy 167, 173 (Hoover
2000).
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D. GREATER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION SUFFERS FROM
NUMEROUS MONITORING AND, THEREFORE, ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
If regulations are to have any real effect, they must be enforced with some sort of
penalty for noncompliance-whether that be loss of economic, military, or diplomatic
power and/or wealth. For penalties to be implemented, violations must be assessed,
and assessment requires monitoring to detect noncompliance.
The problems of enforcement become crystal clear if we ask what would happen
if Al Gore's declaration that we "make the rescue of the environment the central
organizing principle for civilization" were taken seriously." Henry Miller sums up the
farcical nature of this principle by asking, "[H]ow would Americans (to say nothing of
citizens of other countries) react to Washington launching cruise missiles at Chinas
Three Gorges Dam because it has negative environmental consequences?' "
Catching noncompliant countries will be costly if not impossible. This is evident
from the problems individual countries have faced trying to make their own citizens
comply with international agreements such as the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species ("CITES") ban on ivory trading. Detecting whether a country
is cheating on something like emission rights will surely be as difficult, unless an
international police force can monitor within countries, something most countries are
not likely to condone.
Even if there were an international police force, the data required to detect
noncompliance may not be accurate. Monitoring technology may be poor, or those
keeping the records may have an incentive to cheat. Kal Raustiala and David Victor
conclude, from their sampling of international agreements, that "national data often
are not comparable, and their accuracy is often low or unknown:
42. Albert Gore, Earth in the Balance 269 (Houghton 1992).
43. Henry L Miller, Biotechnoloy Regulation at 226 (cited in note 36).
44. Consider Michael 't Sas Rolfes, Assessing CIT.S: Four Case Studies, in Jon Hutton and Barnabas
Kicson, eds, Endangered Species Threatened Convenion: The Past. Present and Future of CITES 69, 69-78
(Earthscan 2000). After the ninth CITES meeting, held in 1994,2 report was rleaed by a group of
respected elephant scientists. It found the results of the ivory ban to be mixed. vith some range
stares reporting increased poaching. The report also noted that the field enforcement budgets were
falling in most range states. Id at 76.
45. Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, Conclusions, in David G. Victor, Kal Rausiah, and Eugene B.
Skolnikoff, eds, The Iinpletnen tation of International Fnironmental Commintn:ents: Th:ory and Pr-tt:e 659,
680 (MIT 1998).
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E. ULTIMATELY, GREATER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
SUFFERS FROM A LACK OF LOCAL INFORMATION, LACK OF COMPETING
INSTITUTIONS, AND LACK OF LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The benefits of federalism and devolving government to the lowest level possible
were pointed out by Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill.4 First, there is better
information at the local level, so specific circumstances are not ignored by "one size fits
no one" policies. The CITES ban on trade in ivory, for example, ignores the
circumstances of local people in Africa and their potential to manage wildlife
sustainably. CITES is an example of top-down regulation failing to take advantage of
time- and place-specific knowledge typical of centralized environmental management.
Second, the more policy decisions devolve to the local level, the more experiments
there are in developing effective institutions. These experiments compete with one
another and lead to better solutions. Finally, accountability at the local level means
that policy makers are more likely to face the consequences of their actions.
International agreements generally fly counter to all these benefits. In fact, the
harms of moving policymaking and responsibility from smaller to larger communities
may be greater when moving from international to national control than when moving
from national control to state or local control. This is because international regulation
involves even more heterogeneous populations and environments.
V. COASE, PIGOU, AND INTERNATIONAL FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
A.C. Pigou emphasized the concept of externalities in looking at environmental
problems.47 When individuals make economic decisions without incorporating the full
costs and benefits to society, according to Pigou, they will either overproduce in the
case of negative externalities (for example, pollution) or they will underproduce in the
case of positive externalities (for example, biological diversity). Pigou's arguments have
been used to justify local, state, national, and international government intervention,
in the form of regulation and taxes, to correct the perverse effects of these
externalities.
Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase saw matters in a different light. Instead of
externalities, Coase considered environmental problems as a case of competing uses."
Those who pollute the air and those who want clean air have differing uses for the air.
The question is no longer one of correcting externalities, but one of who owns the air.
Once this has been decided and a property right to the air has been established, then
the two parties can negotiate with one another through voluntary transactions for use
46. See Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, Introduction: Environmental Federalism: Thinking Smaller, in
Terry L. Anderson and PeterJ. Hill, eds, Environmental Federalism xi (Rowman Littlefield 1997).
47. A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Wefare ch 9 § 10 at 184-86 (MacMilan 4th ed 1932).
48. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J L & Econ 1, 1-44 (1960).
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of the air. These negotiations, or market processes, can determine the value of the air
and its ultimate utilization.
Of course, defining. enforcing and bargaining over property rights are not
costless, as Coase recognized. If definition, enforcement, and/or bargaining are too
costly, however, it may be difficult or impossible for the Coasean system to resolve the
conflicting uses.
Free market environmentalism argues that the case against Coasean bargaining as
a solution to environmental problems is overstated especially if governments work to
lower definition, enforcement, and bargaining costs. It argues for better-defined
property rights and points out that government can aid in defining property rights
through common law courts and other means that lower the costs of definition. Free
market environmentalism also advocates devolving decision-making to the lowest level
possible. It thereby offers an alternative to the problems that come with the current
greening of foreign policy.
A full description of free market environmentalism and the reasoning underlying
it would require too much space for this paper. Two key insights from this approach
to environmental protection, however, make clear that the greening of foreign policy,
if it is allowed to continue, may do more environmental harm than good. These two
insights are: 1) wealthier is healthier and 2) incentives matter.
The first tenet of free market environmentalism, wealthier is healthier, is derived
from economic research linking wealth to environmental quality. "A growing body of
empirical evidence shows a positive correlation among property rights, economic
growth, and environmental quality,"' writes Anderson. For example, he cites work
by Don Coursey showing that environmental quality has an income elasticity of
demand of approximately 2.5.' That is, above a threshold level, a ten percent increase
in income results in a twenty-five percent increase in the demand for environmental
amenities. Two economists examined air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide emissions
and found a 'j-curve" relationship between environmental quality and gross domestic
product." Their research showed that although pollution levels may increase as
incomes begin to rise from very low levels, most pollution levels ultimately decline
before annual income levels reach $11,000 (in 1999 dollars).
In other words, as people become richer, they begin to improve their
surroundings and seek environmental amenities. Any foreign policy striving to
improve environmental quality should promote economic growth because only then
49. Terry L Anderson, Bucking dte Tide of Globalismn: Developing Prorty Rtihbs from &:k Ground Up, in
Terry L Anderson and Henry I. Miller, eds, Greening of US Foreign Poltry 249,258 (Hoover 2000).
50. See working paper of Don Coursey, The Demand for Fawironmental Quality, John M. Olin School of
Business, Washington University (Dec 1992).
51. Gene Grossman and Alan B. Krueger, Economic Gro, and i.e Environment 110 QJ Eeon 353, 366
(1995).
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can environmental progress be made. Efforts to hamper free trade in the name of
environmental protection are counterproductive. As WTO Director-General Mike
Moore said, "Our goal is very clear, it's better living standards for all our people.
Because it is through higher living standards that we achieve better health care,
superior education systems, and a safer, better environment."" The data documenting
that economic growth is the best way to achieve Moore's goals are incontrovertible."
The second tenet of free market environmentalism, incentives matter, recognizes
the fact that people pursue the goals that directly and significantly affect them. In
governments and international organizations, perverse incentives often result. A large
body of literature has documented the destruction of the environment that occurs
from perverse incentives under the rubric of government-subsidized activities.54
The best way to get the incentives right is to provide institutional arrangements
with well-defined and enforceable property rights. In his empirical work, economist
Seth Norton found that "environmental quality and economic growth rates are
greater in regimes where property rights are well defined than in regimes where
property rights are poorly defined.""
When property rights are well defined, defended, and tradable, people have an
incentive to act in ways that are socially beneficial, including ways that preserve the
environment. The most effective property rights are those held by private entities,
whether individuals, businesses, or nonprofit organizations, because these entities bear
both the costs and benefits of their actions. In areas where individual property rights
cannot be established, decisions should be made at the local level, where possible, and
then the state level before reaching national and international levels. As Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes remarked in 1929, after he served on the Permanent Court of
International Justice, "[T]he treaty-making power is intended for the purpose of
having treaties made relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of
the United States in their internal concerns.,,6
52. World Trade Organization, Moore Spells Out Priorities for Seattle Ministerial Conference, Press Release
135 (Sept 2, 1999), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres99_e/prl35_e.htm> (visited Sept 30, 2001).
53. See Indur M. Goklany, Economic Growth and the State of Humanity, PERC Policy Scries-21, available
online at <http://www.perc.org/ps21.pdf> (visited Sept 30, 2001).
54. See, for example, Richard L. Stroup and Jane S. Shaw, Environmental Harms from Federal Government
Policy, in Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle, eds, Taking the Environment Seriously 51 (Rowman &
Littlefield 1993); Terry L. Anderson and Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environnentalism (Westview
1991).
55. Seth Norton, Property Rights, the Environment and Economic Well-Being, in Peter J. Hill and Roger E.
Meiners, eds, Who Owns the Environment? 37, 51 (Rowman & Littlefield 2000); see also Hernando de
Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumpbs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (Basic
2000).
56. Jeremy Rabkin, The Value of Sovereignty at 15 (cited in note 35).
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If delegation of authority must go to the international level, only nations with a
direct interest should be involved in the policy making as they have more incentive to
find the best solution. As more parties sign on to a convention or treaty, there is less
chance for actual cooperation and resolution and greater chance for loss of
sovereignty.'
The alternative is open-door participation of the kind that is expanding in
todays international arena. This option risks suppressing science for politics. William
Aron, a former United States Whaling Commissioner, suggests this is what happened
with the International Whaling Commission ("IWC'). He and his coauthors note
that, "Any nation can accept the 1946 convention and become an equal voting
member of the IWC."" Even landlocked countries can join the commission.
Countries not directly affected by whales or whaling can vote on policies with the
same degree of power as countries with a direct economic and cultural stake in
whaling policy.
Environmental organizations have taken advantage of this situation. According
to some observers, Greenpeace worked to pack the IWC against whaling and may
even have paid membership fees for new member countries.: Open participation
undoubtedly contributes to the continuing moratorium on whaling for certain species
of whale that scientific data indicate are no longer endangered.
Far more effective and appropriate are treaties that involve only those with a
direct interest. The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty is an example."' This
environmental treaty was signed in 1911 (before anyone would have called it an
environmental treaty). In order to protect the fur seal population from over-harvest,
the four nations involved in fur seal harvest-the US, Canada, Russia, and Japan-
signed an agreement setting quotas for each country. Breach of the contract was
punishable by dissolution of the treaty. Because dissolution would lead to a return to
over-harvesting and thereby destroy the value of the resource, the countries had an
incentive to play by the rules. After all, they held claim to all the benefits of future seal
harvests. Other countries were discouraged from entry into the fur seal market by
credible threats of trade sanctions.
Another example of the benefits of limited international involvement stems from
an arbitration involving two countries. In the 1941 Trail Smelter arbitration, fumes
57. Scott Barrett, Heterogeneous International Environniental Agrwnents, in Carlo Carraro, ecd, Interr.a:ral
Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues 9-25 (Edward Elgar 1994).
58. William Aron, William Burke, and Milton Freeman, Flouting te Convenion, 283 Atlantic Monthly
22,24 (May 1999).
59. Steinar Andresen, The Making and Iplementation of Wbaling Poltaee Dc:s Parau.ptun M,aC a
Difference, in David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds, T:e Imncneaun ar
Effectiveness of International Environmnental Commitments: Tcory and Practice 431.439-40 (MIT 1993).
60. Julian Morris, International Environmental Agrenents: Developing Anrtl:rr Path, in Terry L Anderson
and Henry I. Miller, eds, The Greening of US Foreipi Policy 267.274-75 (Hoover 2000).
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from a smelter operated by the Cominco Ltd. in British Columbia, Canada, were
harming cattle ranchers in the United States. The ranchers petitioned the US
government for help, since suing a foreign company directly did not give the ranchers
much chance of winning an injunction. The case was taken to arbitration and settled.
No other country had a direct interest in the case, and so no other country was
involved. As a result of the arbitration, the ranchers were granted an injunction and
awarded damages from Cominco.i
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
To encourage property rights solutions that create the proper incentives, US
foreign policy and international agreements must respect the rule of law, recognize
that wealth leads to environmental protection, and recognize that devolution
encourages better management. With that in mind, the following policies should be
adopted:
o Policies that promote economic growth should be encouraged in order to
spur wealth and thus a desire for environmental quality. Two of these policies
are eliminating restrictions on trade and refraining from the casual use of
economic sanctions.
o Environmental decisionmaking should be devolved to the most local level
possible. This will increase accountability, information, and competitive
solutions that will lead to better environmental management. It will reduce
the likelihood of policies with unintended consequences.
o Because international environmental treaties have significant implications for
the sovereignty and accountability of governments, they should be confined to
issues that cannot be solved through protection of property rights and
domestic policies. If an environmental problem can be handled internally,
there is no need for international regulations that encourage encroachment on
sovereign powers and discourage democratic accountability.
o Policies should be determined by officials accountable to those who will be
affected by the new rules, not by unelected nongovernmental organizations or
international bureaucrats.
o Foreign policy must support sovereign states that respect and enforce
property rights and the rule of law. This will increase the chances of fostering
free market solutions.
In sum, the rise of international environmentalism is posing grave dangers for the
conduct of foreign policy, while at the same time short-changing long-run
environmental protection in favor of currently popular "green" causes. Where conflicts
over resource use do cross international borders, international procedures have a place.
61. Id at 271-72.
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In these cases, the policies should be confined to the countries directly involved. Every
effort should be made to avoid the IWC approach, which allows all countries, even
those not involved in the environmental conflict, a seat at the table.
The greening of US foreign policy should be reined in. US foreign policy should
address real international environmental problems in those few cases where it is
necessary and should not use international law simply to export US environmental
preferences. Nor should environmental policy be set by bureaucrats in organizations
ill-equipped for it, such as the Department of Defense.
Property rights and trade liberalization must be respected. International
solutions, where they are not needed, will only give more power to a system that
weakens sovereignty and political accountability at home and abroad. By improving
accountability and freeing trade, the nations of the world can contribute to economic
progress and to environmental protection.
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